class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide # Dirty Wars ## Exporting Repression ### Jack McDonald --- class: inverse # Lecture Outline .pull-left[ How do market forces and economic interdependence shape the spread of digital repression? ] .pull-right[ - The Digital Surveillance Market - Exporting Technology and Practice - Digital Repression and International Politics - Xinjiang: What Can Be Done? - Population Control in Context - Conclusions and Connections ] ## Main Points Surveillance and digital repression starts at home Impossible to separate out commercial, strategic, and normative concerns in the study of digital repression There is the long-term possibility of normative systems emerging built upon export of repressive digital technologies ??? asd --- class: inverse # Part 1: The Digital Surveillance Market ??? - Reflection on course: population control - We looked at how population control was a key theme in dirty wars - We should consider how digital tech enables population control - State use of digital tech for repression exists in the context of a market for surveillance products - This is everything from breaking password protected devices, to spyware apps installed on phones --- # Surveillance Products > XCP and MediaMax presented unique marketing challenges for Sony BMG. Since fully-informed customers were unlikely to pay full price for what they would view as an inferior product, Sony BMG faced a choice. It could either develop a product that included DRM but was nonetheless attractive to consumers-most likely by significantly reducing retail prices--or it could obfuscate the nature of the product it sold and prevent its customers from excising the unwanted DRM post-purchase. All evidence suggests that Sony BMG adopted the latter approach. Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Penanowski, _The Magnificence of the Distaster: Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident_ ??? - Key point: corporate surveillance is often indistinguishable from state surveillance at a tech level - EG Rootkits - software that enables a third party access to your computer without consent or knowledge - A good controversy of this in the civilian world was corporate responses to filesharing - Sony produced CDs that would install rootkits on users' computers to prevent them from copying the music - This introduces vulnerabilities - as we discussed in encryption lecture last week --- # Spyware > "Malware" is short for malicious software and is typically used as a catch-all term to refer to any software designed to cause damage to a single computer, server, or computer network, whether it's a virus, spyware, et al. Robert Moir, _Defining Malware_ Spyware is a form of malware that gathers information without a user's knowledge and transfers it to a third party. There are many reasons for using malware ??? - Spyware is a common form of malware used for surveillance - Reliance upon digital devices means susceptibility to malware use - Malware is distinguishable from corporate systems monitoring by consent and knowledge of the user - However many apps in commercial world are, for all intents and purposes, data harvesters, and considered Malware by some https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/dd632948(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN --- # Stalkerware .pic80[![Stalkerware](img/r9/stalkerware.png)] > Though often, and shamelessly, advertised as a tool for parents to track the activity of their children, these apps are commonly used against survivors of domestic abuse. > It serves as no surprise. Stalkerware coils around a victim’s digital life, giving abusive partners what they crave: control. David Ruiz, _Helping survivors of domestic abuse: What to do when you find stalkerware_ ??? - The need to monitor other digital devices exists in many contexts - At a device level, the monitoring of your kid's phone is no different to monitoring a spouse's phone, no diff to intelligence agencies monitoring phone for intel collection - Relating back to last week's lecture - hollowing of policy options - I'd ban stalkerware, but parents might resist - Also, we can see how platforms transcend context - e.g. Absher app in Saudi Arabia that monitors KSA's Guardianship laws --- # Designed Values Remember this? > The instruments which serve authority best are those which expend the smallest amount of energy possible to produce the effects of control or domination. Olivier Razac, _Barbed Wire: A Political History_ > A new way of controlling the land, designed to make more efficient use of it, transformed the relations not only between humans and animals but also between different human groups — distinguished by their different access to the new technologies of control over space. Reviel Netz, _Barbed Wire_ ??? - This brings us back to population control - All states now exist in a world where there is an open market for surveillance tech and malware - This is very different from optimistic visions for internet/WWW - But perhaps it is a better reflection of what human beings are like? - Digital ICTs now enable new forms of observation and control, with obvious impacts for population control --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .large[Do you think that stalkerware/spyware should be allowed on App stores? Do you think that Apple/Google should have the right to determine what software you use?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 2: Exporting Technology and Practice ??? - So we have to corporate context, but how are states operating in this context? - Leads back to points we came across in first term - state aid for repression in other countries - In this session we will cover the export of technologies and practice for political repression - This is going to be increasingly important - digital tech is well positioned for export as a form of infrastructure - Just as AWS can be dragged and dropped across the planet, so can filtering capabilities, etc, but this is imperfect - also need expertise --- # Exporting Repressive Capabilities .pull-left[ We have encountered this in our course so far, e.g.: - US aid to South American governments with interrogation techniques - US assistance in Vietnam ] .pull-right[ What does it mean to "export repression"? - Imposing domestic political repression upon groups abroad - Enabling political repression in other states - Providing capabilities, training, and other forms of assistance ] ??? - Inter-state dimension of political repression is important - For example, understanding Operation Condor and relations between LA states and USA during dirty war and other similar campaigns is as important as relations between revolutionary/terrorist groups - Key point: states learn from each other, often transmit capabilities via technical assistance and training - Often key controversies in liberal democracies - e.g. School of Americas in US taught COIN techniques to repressive states --- # Information, Advice & Assistance .pull-left[ ![Boris John's water cannon](img/r9/water.png) ] .pull-right[ Model of states as information processing entities: some are better at processing than others - Provision of collected/processed information - Training in information processing Practical dimension to repression: it requires tools (and people) - Global markets for tear gas and other crowd-control devices ] ??? - Note, culture, values, law shapes adoption of capabilities, e.g. water cannons in the UK - Key in our context is provision of capabilities that enable data processing and data access - These are sustained by global markets for equipment and people - These are state-supported - unlikely that such markets would persist without state support for industry, or state customers for products - That said, also strategic, keeping own defence base alive often requires exports --- # Expertise > Two weeks after leaving her position as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. National Security Agency in 2014, Lori Stroud was in the Middle East working as a hacker for an Arab monarchy. > She had joined Project Raven, a clandestine team that included more than a dozen former U.S. intelligence operatives recruited to help the United Arab Emirates engage in surveillance of other governments, militants and human rights activists critical of the monarchy. Christopher Bing and Joel Schectman, _Inside the UAE’s Secret Hacking Team of American Mercenaries_ ??? - A key issue is that individuals often acquire expertise in matters related to repression by working for the government - In a free market, these individuals look to get paid for their skills elsewhere - In war studies, we are used to the study of mercenaries and PMCs - key purchasers of military expertise - In context of digital repression, need to consider market for "black hat" technical experts and intelligence officials - This exists in context of global market for information security professionals - hard to regulate --- # Tools & Technologies > The law does not prohibit the sale of surveillance and interception equipment to foreign governments and law-enforcement agencies, the exports are approved by the Defense Exports Control Agency (a unit in the Defense Ministry), and the items in question are used to thwart terrorism and crime. Hagar Shezaf and Jonathan Jacobson, _Revealed: Israel's Cyber-spy Industry Helps World Dictators Hunt Dissidents and Gays_ ??? - Regulation of repressive technology exports has context - regulation of provision of riot control technologies and expertise - Access to digital devices requires tools, and private companies now develop these - Inextricably tied to defence industry and export controls for defence technologies - Here government regulation shapes what can, and cannot, be built and exported - But these companies make money - how to differentiate between mobile apps that harvest data, tracker apps and malware providers is a legal/social question --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .large[Do you think that stalkerware/spyware should be subject to export controls? How could that be implemented?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 3: Digital Repression and International Politics ??? - Key frame for understanding importance of exports is "export of authoritarianism" - This is the idea that states, like China, seek to export technolgies to make the world safe for authoritarianism - Reflect back to IR: soft power and hard power - is this either? - Democratic states have sought to make the world safe for democracy, and tech has helped - e.g. US Office of Naval Research/DARPA involvement in development of TOR - Export of technical means for repression therefore key area of contention in international politics --- # Exporting Authoritarianism > Beijing no longer views information technology solely in terms of economic development, but also its value to Chinese foreign policy and strategy. The Xi regime has aggressively pushed Chinese information technology as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the strategic investment vehicle China uses to finance major infrastructure projects abroad. Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, _Exporting Digital Authoritarianism_ ??? - View in the 1990s was that the arc of history tended towards liberal democracy - In truth, both west and soviets propped up authoritarian states during cold war for geopolitical reasons - Authoritarian states proved capable of navigating the currents of a globalised world - China has both economic and strategic reasons to push BRI - Democracy is hard to push - enabling top-down control perhaps easier --- # Export Controls > Open societies will need to marshal an array of responses in the contest ahead. Democracies will need to slap sanctions on the individuals and groups using new tools for repressive ends, inflict higher costs on technology companies complicit in gross human-rights abuses, invest in countermeasures and harden their own systems against external intrusions. Free governments will also have to differentiate between using new technologies for legitimate purposes (such as traditional law enforcement) and using them to solidify single-party control, curtail basic rights and meddle in democracies abroad. Richard Fontaine and Kara Frederick, _The Autocrat's New Tool Kit_ ??? - Key point: Companies in the west have been part of the problem from the outset - Cisco and the great firewall of china - Export of authoritarian tech/capabilities easy to reconcile for an authoritarian state - Strategic, economic, and value divergence in liberal democratic states - Commitment to free trade and international competition - challenges economic structure, and cedes markets to authoritarian competitors - China now equal in sophistication in numerous domains of the ICT industry --- # The Defence Industry/Arms Trade Basic problem in defence planning: - Defence industrial base needs profit to survive - Requires state support to survive - Exports reduce costs to the state, and make companies viable Exports are licensed, and this is a highly political area The UK's defence sector produced £14bn of exports in 2018 ??? - Key point: Strategic/economic value of exports is important to many states - Need exports to sustain domestic industry - Alternative is hugely expensive defence spending - Look to Campaign Against the Arms Trade for examples of political controversies here - Export controls on military tech, vs riot control tech vs intangible capabilities --- # Digital Export Controls ![China's exports](img/r9/aspi.jpg) > Some of these companies lead the world in cutting-edge technology development, particularly in the AI and surveillance sectors. But this technology development is focused on servicing authoritarian needs, and as these companies go global (an expansion often funded by PRC loans and aid) this technology is going global as well. This alone should give Western policymakers pause. Danielle Cave, Fergus Ryan & Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, _Mapping more of China's tech giants: AI and surveillance_ ??? - Competition in digital technologies is a huge strategic issue - Technologies underlying many surveillance use-cases require data - This is different from an arms race/traditional competition - Worry is that if CN companies get a market edge, they will develop an incomparable lead - Huge geostrategic problem - note lack of EU tech companies - how will those develop? - Ultimately, my view is that UK etc shouldn't compete in malware/stalkerware, but what about surveillance infrastructure? --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .large[Should countries compete in the global market for spyware? What might be the consequences if they don't?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 4: Xinjiang: What Can Be Done? ??? 1. Xinjiang is a good example of a persistent problem in international politics: significant human rights violations where international intervention is impossible 2. Xinjiang is also a harbinger of international politics after American hegemony 3. It appears unlikely that American hegemony will be sustainable in the face of Chinese ascent in the 21st century 4. Leads to question: return to a bi-polar world, or a multi polar future? 5. Given strength of Chinese economy and state, also demonstrates issues with many levers of persuasion/coercion - can't embargo China --- # Case Study: Xinjiang .pic80[![Satellite imagery](img/r6/camps.png) ] > According to this logic, replacing religious beliefs with 'correct' state ideology through re-education is akin to a detoxification process that is freely provided by a benevolent state. > While there is no certainty, it is reasonable to speculate that the total number of detainees is between several hundred thousand and just over one million. Adrian Zenz, _'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude'_ ??? --- # Why Study Xinjiang? .pull-left[ ![Gulag](img/r6/gulag.jpg) As a continuation of old forms of repression ] .pull-right[ ![Credit](img/r6/credit.jpg) As something radically new ] ??? --- # Power and International Politics > One of the main purposes of the Melian Dialogue is to make clear that both sides have a point. Its dramatic power is increased by the presentation of two opposite though complementary political ideals and attitudes. The reader and "spectator" may identify himself with either side and ask himself what he would say or do in the same situation. Or, better still, he may recognize that the position taken by both sides is equally natural and justified and that both have to be seen together as expressing different aspects of the same issue. But, as in Attic tragedy and in Plato's _Apology_ or _Gorgias_, whatever words are spoken by either party appear tragically futile when read with the knowledge of the inexorable and bitter end. Felix Martin Wassermann, _The Melian Dialogue_ ??? 1. Does "might make right"? No, but how can "right" alter the decisions of those with might? 2. Key line of Melian Dialogue is that weak shall suffer as they must, but also Athenians "we should gain by not destroying you" - violence is costly 3. Xinjiang demonstrates a paradox - the more important/saliant an issue becomes in international politics, the more states have to lose in terms of honour/face if they choose to change course 4. Xinjiang also demonstrates limits of right in international politics - global governance posits no limit to intervention and importance of rights/law/morality, whereas realism traditionally accepts limits of power and practical ability to change the world 5. So, is international pressure and shame over Xinjiang counter-productive? If it is, why do it? Do agents and orgs do it for their own sense of self rather than to aid? Leads to a tragic vision of normative pressure --- # Normative Pressure .pull-left[ ![Amnesty international](img/r10/amnestyx.jpg) ] .pull-right[ ![Amnesty international](img/r10/xinjlet.png) ] ??? 1. What kinds of actors are most amenable to normative pressure in IR? 2. Norms work in hegemonic structures where exile from structure has significant penalties, but does that continue to apply here? 3. Norms also work where normative violations can create conditions for intervention, but here that is not the case - the system structured to prevent intervention in this case 4. This leads to a pretty bleak view, which can get bleaker once we look beyond Xinjiang - is China opposed to "rules based order"? 5. It is important to caveat this - RBO is currently how we describe a period in which actors on all sides opposed "the rules" even if it ever existed --- # Commercial Pressure > the Secretary of State should consider the applicability of existing authorities, including the Global Magnitsky Act.. to impose targeted sanctions on members of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and state security apparatus, including Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and other officials credibly alleged to be responsible for human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere; H.R.649 - Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019 > But few in Berlin expect German companies to divest. “You can imagine the trouble VW would get into in China if they closed their factory because of the deteriorating human rights situation in the region,” said Max Zenglein of the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Guy Chazan, _Deutschland AG sticks with Xinjiang despite Uighurs mistreatment_ ??? 1. A second tool is commercial pressure - sanctions etc 2. Here the US has some levers to pull - but is Xinjiang important enough to pull them? (also, given that we're headed for a global recession/depression, what's the consequences?) 3. Idea was that by integrating China into globalised economy its government would essentially be domiciled with liberal values after development 4. Consequence is that world is now fully integrated with china, and therefore sanctions hurt both ways 5. For this reason, appears not much can be done, but some argue there is - regulating technology --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .large[Do you think there is any hope of external influence or engagement helping the Uyghurs?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 5: Population Control in Context ??? 1. This last part of the lecture has been updated slightly from what I planned 2. I've been working on population control as a way of thinking about the relationship between war and political repression 3. In Xinjiang, we see a form of population control that is testing technologies and techniques that can, and have, been employed elsewhere 4. So from this perspective, Xinjiang could be a harbinger of the future 5. Since "lockdown" has now enetered the global vernacular, we should consider this carefully --- # Sovereignty and Community .pull-left[ ![Hobbes' Leviathan](img/r10/leviathan.jpg) ] .pull-right[ ![UN Security Council](img/r10/unsc.jpg) ] ??? 1. Ultimately, who has the right (if anyone) to institute control measures over a population, and why? 2. In this course we've covered the clash of liberal individualism with communitarianism 3. We live in a world of sovereign states that hold the option of instituting population control measures for a variety of reasons 4. In this sense, one thing to look for is the relationship between political culture, perceived political emergency and population control 5. Also see the complete absence of fantastical liberatarianism in current Covid debates - it is a fantasy of no relevance to actual public health/polity-scale problems --- # Grand Strategy and Population Control > The rules-based international order in all its manifestations—which is critical to the UK’s national interest—is under serious threat from multiple directions. > The Government should make the defence of the rules-based international order a central theme of all its bilateral relationships. This is particularly important in the UK’s engagement with the US, China, Russia and emerging powers such as India. > Pressures on the rules-based international order also come from beyond the state, in the form of technology and protests. The roots of this instability are many, but one is the enormous access to information and spread of opinion caused by communications and connectivity. IR and Defence Committee, _A shifting world order necessitates change in UK foreign policy_ ??? 1. Reflecting back on point about making the world safe for authoritarianism: how does population control intersect with grand strategy? 2. Democrats dilemma: need to work with bad partners, prefer order to chaos (deviant globalisation) 3. Want to promote global economic interdependence, but problems with limits that places on action 4. Morality: Hard to accept obvious suffering in other populations 5. How do you differentiate yourself from others using similar techniques without underlying normative/cultural barriers? --- # Public Health and Population Control .pull-left[ ![Karachi segregation camp 1897](img/r10/segregation.jpg) ] .pull-right[ ![Privacy and covid](img/r10/privacy.jpg) ] A couple of key themes from the course: - Context collapse - Role of overlapping authorities/policy frames - Technology for population control can't be limited to a single context unilaterally by states ??? 1. We've studied political emergencies and emergency powers this year 2. Aidan Forth - origins of British concentration camps in public health emergencies/responses in India 3. Public health and public safety, national security, are effectively indivisible on a legal/technical standpoint 4. Watch the response to COVID 19 - how does political culture, legal/social norms, state capacity, effect state responses? 5. Interesting question to consider: does the British state have enough bodies to throw at a quarantine on a Wuhan level? 6. Also, look for how states (Israel) are now responding to health surveillance using digital technologies - emergency powers become stable tools of states --- class: inverse # Reflection Question .large[Do you place any faith in global governance mechanisms limiting the use of repressive technologies by states?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 6: Conclusions and Connections ??? --- # Key Issues .large[ Digital technologies for population control and political repression are a growth market It is hard for Western states to impose their values by market mechanisms What we have learned on this course about the relationship between policy and context provides a way of understanding this issue in greater depth ] ??? both home and abroad --- # Key Questions .large[ How can stalkerware be controlled without handing over more power to large technology companies? What forms of resistance might be possible to counter digital repression? Is there any hope for intervention in modern genocides such as Xinjiang? ]