class: center, middle, inverse, title-slide # Dirty Wars ## Lecture 8: Political Warfare and Political Emergencies ### Jack McDonald ### 2019-11-15 --- class: inverse # Opening Discussion Question .question[ What, if anything, prevents your own government from freely targeting you with political propaganda? ] ??? --- # Outline .pull-left[ From the notion of control, we get the problem of controlling populations and political warfare, as well as the generation of political emergencies at points where control is lost. ] .pull-right[ - Securing the State - Political Warfare - Security Institutions ] ??? --- # Line of Argument Securing the state, from above and below, is a key feature of the kind of conflicts that we are concerned with. Different forms of securing the state (or political repression) contain quite different ideas about political enmity. Regime type, social values, and internal threats pose problems for security institutions, notably in institutional design, purpose, and legitimacy. ??? --- class: inverse # Part 1: Securing the State ??? --- # Why Do It? .left-column[ How regimes end Political survival Polity survival Institutional survival ] .right-column[ > [M]ore severe life-integrity violations should be anticipated among partly free states than in authoritarian states (more murders in the middle [MMM]). It can be inferred, in accord with previous theory, that an increase in freedom among unfree states arouses a greater expression of opposition and provokes greater state repression, leading to more intense and wider-ranging violations–i.e., massacres, calculated murders, and torture. Helen Fine, _More Murder in the Middle_ ] ??? --- # Political Emergencies .pull-left[ States of siege Martial law Emergency powers ] .pull-right[ > The notion that a situation of factual danger, whereby the existence of the state is threatened, allows for the suspension of the normative universe of a rule of law is provided for in almost every account of modern lawful rule. Nasser Hussain, _The Jurisprudence of Emergency_ ] ??? Hussain quote p.16 --- # Who Does It? (Argentina) .pull-left[ > To manage the threat posed by their coercive institutitions, autocrats use a range of techniques often grouped under the heading "coup-proofing." > coup-proofed security services tend to have a _high degree of fragmentation_ ...they tend to be _more socially exclusive_. Sheena Greitens, _Dictators and their Secret Police_ ] .pull-right[ > Militarily weak and isolated, Perón had no other choice in combating subversion than to build a secret army [AAA] with police recruits under police direction. Donald C. Hodges, _Argentina's "Dirty War"_ ] ??? greitens quote from p.24 hodges quote from p.174 --- # Political Order and Legitimacy (DRC) .pull-left[ .small[ > States within the global political economy today face a twin insurgency, one from below, another from above. From below comes a series of interconnected criminal insurgencies in which the global disenfranchised resist, coopt, and route around states as they seek ways to empower and enrich themselves in the shadows of the global economy... From above comes the plutocratic insurgency, in which globalized elites seek to disengage from traditional national obligations and responsibilities. Nils Gilman, _The Twin Insurgency_ ]] .pull-right[  ] ??? --- class: inverse # Small Group Discussion .question[What types of political actors can/can't commit political repression?] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 2: Political Warfare -- > To date, researchers have paid far more attention to the evils done against governments (and citizens) by dissidents, rebels, and terrorists than to the evils done by presidents, the police, military, secret service, national guard, and death squads against those within their territorial jurisdiction. Christian Davenport, _State Repression and Political Order_ ??? --- # Subversion > ...can be defined as illegal measures short of the use of armed force, taken by one section of the people of a country to overthrow those governing the country at the time, or force them to do things which they do not want to do. -- > ...although the British prefer to use the security service and the police, rather than the army, to counter subversion within the United Kingdom, this does not mean that either subversion or the countering of it, is any less a manifestation of war. -- > Subversion is a form of war and countering it, or even fostering it in a hostile foreign country, may, on occasion, have to be included as part of a nation's defence policy. Frank Kitson, _Warfare as a Whole_ ??? --- # Political Repression .pull-left[ .medium[ > What distinguishes political repression from other forms of control, such as general social control or crime control? Moreover, when is something actually repressive, versus just resistant to change—e.g., what is the difference between people who drag their feet against change versus those who actively suppress actors pushing for change? Jennifer Earl, _Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control_ ] ] .pull-right[  Key issue for the current context: What counts as political repression? ] ??? --- # Pacification (Vietnam) .pull-left[ > The term "other war," meaning pacification operations, arose in Vietnam to differentiate those operations from the "real war" of conventional search-and-destroy operations. Austin Long, _On "Other War"_ ] .pull-right[ > As long as there is no privacy, as long as every unusual move or event is reported and checked, as long as parents are afraid to talk in front of their children, how can contacts be made, ideas spread, recruiting accomplished? David Galula, _Counterinsurgency Warfare_ ] ??? Long quote p.2 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf --- # De-Radicalisation .medium[ > ...the de-radicalization campaign implements a holistic strategy... adopts different approaches... deploys multifaceted programs... underscores community engagement... is an experimental undertaking. ] -- .medium[ > In regards to the custodial programs in Xinjiang, it is definitely too early to declare success. Zunyou Zhou, _Chinese Strategy for De-radicalization_ ] -- .medium[ > According to this logic, replacing religious beliefs with 'correct' state ideology through re-education is akin to a detoxification process that is freely provided by a benevolent state. ] -- .medium[ > While there is no certainty, it is reasonable to speculate that the total number of detainees is between several hundred thousand and just over one million. Adrian Zenz, _'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude'_ ] ??? --- class: inverse # Question .question[ How open should democracies be about counter-subversion? ] ??? --- class: inverse # Part 3: Security Institutions ??? --- # Influence, Populations, and Legitimacy (GWOT) .pull-left[  ] .pull-right[ .medium[ > The danger of domestic dissemination does not lie in the dissemination itself; rather, it lies in _anonymous_ dissemination. To curb the potential harm of covert government propaganda, there must be either legislation or a judicial doctrine that requires the State Department and the BBG* to attribute their materials. Weston R. Sager, _Apple Pie Propaganda?_ * Now U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) ] ] ??? --- # Coordination Problems > Another important institutional constraint on pacification was the lack, until very late, of any management structure for it. Neither in Vietnam nor in Washington... was there any agency charged with managing anything so atypical as a pacification program. However important, this aspect of counter-insurgency war had no bureaucratic vested interest speaking for it. Robert W. Komer, _Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification Program_ ??? Quote from p.235 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documents/2006/D20104.pdf --- # Security Forces (N. Ireland) .pull-left[ Organisational constraints - Telos of the organisation - Organisational capacity - Legal and political constraints Rule of law Civil freedoms and civil authorities Institutional interactions, oversight, and accountability ] .pull-right[ .medium[ > [Police] "Civil Reps" as they have become known, have proved extremely useful. In many areas they are the only members of central or local government that the people know and can turn to. The Civil Rep has become a "Mr Fixit", who is also a mine of information on how to get things done-a "red tape dodger". P.W. Graham, _Low-level Civil/Military Coordination, Belfast, 1970-73_ ] ] ??? --- # Intelligence Activity .pull-left[ > Information is a key resource in irregular war; it is the link connecting one side’s strength with the other side’s weakness. > It is possible, nevertheless, to distinguish between three major sources of information: material indices, violent extraction, and consensual provision. Stathis Kalyvas, _The Logic of Violence in Civil War_ ] .pull-right[ .medium[ Problems for states: - Intelligence collection activities that infringe upon civil liberties - Negative social perceptions of intelligence collection in civilian populations - Rumours! Problems for insurgents - Secrecy is life, but intelligence collection exposes networks to denunciation - Balancing intimidation and persuasion is difficult! ] ] ???