The second seminar series examines the inclusion and exclusion of normative evaluations of military strategy and operational practice. In this seminar series we will examine the relationship between counterinsurgency (COIN) and political repression in theory and practice. In particular, the series will examine how contemporary COIN as practiced by liberal democracies often shies away from explicit engagement with the repressive elements of COIN practice. You should read Austin Long’s (2016) The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK over the Christmas break, but otherwise no reading beyond these readings is required for the seminar series.
The idea of this seminar is to focus upon the variable of government type, and the way in which categories of government and governance are constructed. This allows for a deeper interrogation of one of the underlying themes of the module: What, if anything, separates liberal democracies from non-democratic governments in the prosecution of internal conflicts? Over the course of the seminar we will be examining the differences between liberal counterinsurgency and authoritarian counterinsurgency, as well as substantial areas of similarity.
Both war and political repression are part-constituted by the existence of political differences. Normative values therefore play a significant role in both, yet the evaluation of military practice often seeks to identify instrumental utility rather than engage with wider normative issues. In this seminar, we’ll discuss whether the identification of best practices - evaluating military campaigns to identify patterns of success and utility - can ever be a value-free activity.
As you’ll know from the main course, a key problem in the study of conflict is construction of categories and sub-categories. In this seminar we will look at a particular categorisation problem, which is distinguishing counterinsurgency campaigns from civil wars. Is this even possible? When we identify something as a counterinsurgency campaign, are we talking about a conflict, a strategy, or something else?
This seminar examines the inherent biases found in the kind of questions we ask about insurgency and counterinsurgency. In particular, if we seek to measure an agent’s success or failure, how much does the selection of the agent frame our subsequent investigation? We’ll be discussing the analysis of the success/failure of both insurgents and incumbent political authorities.
As outlined in the main lecture series, the ideas and techniques of contemporary COIN have strong ties to the pacification and policing of European empires. Needless to say, these ties are controversial. Nonetheless, contemporary COIN differs in some marked respects, but some argue that the colonial aspect of COIN is inherent to the practice, no matter how much contemporary democracies might seek to distance themselves from past empires. In this seminar, we’ll discuss this issue, in particular whether bracketing out the political dimensions of colonialism from discussions of COIN is itself a political issue.
Contemporary debates about the nature of COIN, and best practices, have given rise to both criticisms and counterpoints. A key counterpoint is the identification of “Authoritarian COIN” by researchers who note that some non-democratic states are markedly successful at COIN, using methods that liberal democratic states consider to be counterproductive or profoundly wrong. In this seminar we will examine some key works on this topic and discuss whether authoritarian COIN exists as a model/framework, or perhaps counts as something else.
Narratives of success and failure play a significant role in the construction of COIN, and evaluation of best practice. In this seminar we will look at a key narrative, that of “minimum force”, which some consider to typify the British approach to COIN. Despite the fact that this narrative faced significant challenge from historians both before and after 9/11, it still persists. Here, we’ll discuss the importance of this narrative in terms of the way it legitimises COIN practices.
Continuing from last week’s seminar, the narrative of British success in COIN - and reasons for success rooted in minimum force - played a significant part in the framing of COIN during the Iraq War. In the early phases of the conflict, it was sometimes reduced to the idea that the British could “do” COIN, and that the American military could learn from their past examples. In this seminar we’ll look at the narrative of minimum force as it played out in the early phases of the Iraq War.
In this seminar we will zero in on the use of Malaya as an example of good COIN practice, notably the way in which the narrative was actually framed in doctrine. It is important to remember that the wider narratives under discussion in previous seminars don’t always filter through to actual doctrine.28 For a good example of this, see Etzioni (2015) and the reply from John Nagl (2015). Nonetheless, examining how and why specific examples of COIN practice are used in doctrine provides a way to frame discussion about the use of history in doctrine itself.
Malaya is often referred to as an archetype of COIN success. However British forces were also successful in a number of other campaigns, notably the suppression of the Mau-Mau revolt in Kenya. However the means and methods of that campaign fly in the face of narratives about restraint as a key element of COIN success. In this seminar we’ll be looking at this is in a wider sense, which is the strange way in which coercion and violence are framed in FM 3-24. Why does it give the impression that coercive force is employed by only one side in a COIN campaign?
In this final seminar, we’ll round off discussion of COIN by returning to the themes of the main lecture series. Contemporary COIN operations have been criticised by both military professionals as well as academics, who often arrive at similar criticisms from quite different starting points. We’ll discuss whether political repression is inherent in COIN, and whether strategic goals like “nation building” can ever succeed without political repression. Lastly, we’ll alse spend some time reflecting on what we have learned over the course.
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